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The Criminal Jurisdiction of Tribal Courts over
An examination of the basic framework of inherent tribal
By Philip S. Deloria* and Nell Jessup Newton**
Throughout most of the historyof federal Indian law, theUnited States Supreme Courthas expressed extraord na
deference to Congress as the principal
policymaker in Indian affairs, while
often filling in gaps with imaginative
characterizations of congressional intent
or relying implicitly on its own power to
create federal common law. Judicially
articulated doctrines such as that of in-
herent tribal sovereignty have rightly
been identified as providing the legal
framework which has given conceptual
stability to Indian law and influenced
Congress to enact some of its more hu-
mane Indian legislation. But in more
recent years the balance has switched; it
is now the Congress that is the protector
of tribal interests against the onslaughts
of a Supreme Court bent on making its
own Indian policy to please its western
members.
In Duro v. Reina,' the Supreme Court
broke with history and tradition in Indi-
an law and held that Indian tribes' re-
tained criminal jurisdiction does not ex-
tend to Indians who are not members of
the particular tribe. The case arose
when shots fired during an altercation
on the Salt River Pima Maricopa reser-
vation in Arizona killed a fourteen-year-
old member of the nearby Gila River In-
dian tribe who was two blocks away. The
federal prosecutor indicted Duro, a Cali-
fornia Mission Indian, for murder, one
of the federal Major Crimes under 18
U.S.C. § 1153, and then dropped the
charges. Although tribal courts may
have concurrent jurisdiction over Major
Crimes, 2 federal law limits the punish-
ments that tribal courts can impose to
not more than one year in jail and not
more than $5,000 in fines. As a result,
tribes often choose to charge miscreants
with lesser offenses, as did the Salt River
tribe by charging Duro with unlawful
discharging of a firearm. The defen-
dant unsuccessfully moved to dismiss on
the grounds that the tribe lacked juris-
diction over him because he was not a
member of the Salt River Pima-Marico-
pa Tribe, and sought a writ of habeas
corpus in federal court under the 1968
Civil Rights Act. The Supreme Court re-
versed the Ninth Circuit's denial of the
writ. In so doing, the Court ignored 200
years of congressional policy recogniz-
ing tribal court criminal jurisdiction
over non-member Indians. The result is
a void in jurisdiction-states cannot ex-
ercise jurisdiction over any Indians on
the reservation, members or non-mem-
hers; federal law exempts non-members
from federal jurisdiction if they commit
a crime against another Indian in Indi-
an country.' Tribes, forced to open their
jails and free non-member prisoners,
and faced with an influx of non-mem-
bers during the summer celebrations, re-
acted with outrage. In Duro's aftermath
many proposals were made to Congress
not .just to rectify the decision, but also
to begin reasserting its primary role in
setting Indian policy for the nation.
Congress responded by means of a
rider to the Defense Appropriations Act
amending the definition sections of the
Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA)5 to cor-
rect the Court's misreading of congres-
sional intent and thus, in a sense, to
overturn Duro.' To the present defini-
tion of "powers of self-government," the
amendment adds: "means the inherent
power of Indian Tribes, hereby recog-
nized and affirmed, to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over all Indians."' The
amendment also adds a definition of the
term "Indian":
Indian means any person who would
be subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States as an Indian tinder sec-
tion 1153, title 18, United States Code
if that person were to commit an of-
fense listed in that section in Indian
country to which that section applies.'
A final provision restricts the temporal
effect of the amendment:
The effects of subsections (b) and (c)
as those subsections affect the crimi-
nal misdemeanor jurisdiction of trib-
al courts over non-member Indians
shall have no effect after September
30, 1991.'
This unique law, designed to clarify
congressional policy on the inherent
powers of Indian tribes, the events lead-
ing up to its passage, and its appropri-
ateness both as a matter of Indian policy
and constitutional policy, are the sub-
jects of this article.
We will first sketch the basic frame-
work of tribal sovereignty and specifical-
ly criminal jurisdiction in Indian Coun-
try before and after Duro. Then, after
reviewing the Court's recent activism in
setting judicial limits on tribal sovereign-
ty, we will turn to an analysis of the re-
cent amendments and recommenda-
tions for the future.
Tribal Inherent Sovereignty
Indian tribes predate the Constitution;
their place in our constitutional system is
by virtue of their relationship with the
federal government as defined by the
plenary power of Congress on the sub-
ject of Indian affairs. While not juridical
entities for purposes of international
law,"' neither are Indian tribes arms of
the federal or of the state governments.
They exercise their own inherent
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sovereignty before and after Duro v. Reina.
sovereign powers, subject to the overrid-
ing sovereignty of the national govern-
ment. Relying on its powers under the
Indian Commerce clause, the treaty
clauses, and the war powers, Congress
has exercised authority over Indian tribes
and continues to be the branch of gov-
ernment charged with making Indian
policy under the Constitution.
Congress has exercised this power to
limit the reach of tribal sovereignty in
two respects that are particularly impor-
tant to understanding the background
of the Duro case. First, since the consti-
tutional limitations on governmental
power of the Bill of Rights do not apply
to Indian tribes, Congress enacted the
Indian Civil Rights Act in 1968 to apply
most of the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights as statutory obligations binding
Indian tribes.' Second, Congress has
granted criminal jurisdiction to some
states over all crimes (except fish and
game laws) occurring on Indian reserva-
tions in Public Law 28012 and other
statutes specific to various states."
Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian
Country
1. The Statutory Scheme
Where the state has not been given
criminal jurisdiction on the reserva-
tions" statutorily, the federal courts have
jurisdiction over most felonies involving
Indians. 5 If an Indian defendant is
charged with one of the thirteen crimes
listed in the federal Major Crimes Act,'
the federal courts have jurisdiction. If
either the victim or the defendant is an
Indian and the crime is other than one
of the Major Crimes, federal courts have
jurisdiction under the General Crimes
Act,'7 although they may be instructed to
apply state law if federal law does not de-
fine the offense.' Federal jurisdiction
under these two statutes preempts state
jurisdiction over these crimes."
This scheme, while abrogating tribal
sovereignty to some extent, leaves tribes
with a great deal of power to punish
those offending against the peace and
order on the reservation. Tribes have
concurrent jurisdiction over both
"major" and "general" crimes."' In addi-
tion, the General Crimes Act recognizes
that tribes have exclusive jurisdiction
over general crimes committed by one
Indian against another.' These "Indian
against Indian" crimes have thus been
left to the jurisdiction of the most inter-
ested forum, the tribal court.
2. Common Law Exceptions
In 1978, the Supreme Court removed
non-Indians from tribal criminal jurisdic-
tion on the theory that exercising such
jurisdiction was inconsistent with Indian
tribes' dependent status. Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe"2 represented a
novel departure from the basic tenet of
Indian law discussed above-that Indian
tribes retain inherent sovereignty over
internal affairs absent express abroga-
tion by Congress. According to the
classic formulation before Oliphant:
"What is not expressly limited remains
within the domain of tribal sovereign-
ty."21 Acknowledging that there was no
federal statute denying tribes this juris-
diction, the Court reasoned that a
statute was unnecessary. In the absence
of any clear congressional guidance, the
Court relied on unenacted bills, lower
court opinions, and other somewhat du-
bious expressions of the shared pre-
sumptions of the executive, legislative,
and judicial branches that tribes lacked
such power.
Although rendering a federal com-
mon law opinion, the Court seemed in-
fluenced by two factors: first, a concern
that non-Indians were barred from par-
ticipating in tribal political life, and sec-
ond, a concern that non-Indians would
suffer racial discrimination in a system
dominated by Indians.
Duro took this principle one step fur-
ther by extending it to Indian non-mem-
bers of the tribe. Although the Court
admitted that the historical record re-
garding tribal court criminal jurisdiction
over non-member Indians was "some-
what less illuminating than Oliphant,"" it
nevertheless concluded that the record
"tends to support the conclusion we rea-
son." ' The opinion can be criticized on
many grounds,"+ some of which will be
explored below. Initially, however, it is
important to note that the opinion's dis-
tinction between enrolled members and
all other Indians reveals a serious igno-
rance of the realities of Indian country,
as those realities affect and involve Indi-
an non-members."
Demographics in Indian Country
In particular, the Court demonstrated
no awareness of the real circumstances
of Indian communities. In fact, there
are three classes of Indian people, all of
them significant in size. The first in-
cludes tribal members living on their
own reservations and therefore subject
both to tribal and federal jurisdiction.
The second includes Indian people who
are enrolled in a tribe, but who live on
another reservation, and who are, after
Duro, not subject to tribal jurisdiction,
but otherwise "Indians" for all federal
purposes. This group includes many
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and Indi-
an Health Service (IHS) employees, In-
dians who have married a member of
the tribe and their offspring, and those
working on the reservation, as well as
the increasing numbers of Indians who
reside on or near reservations of other
tribes, preferring to live or work near
other Indians but not on their own
reservation.2 The third, and most prob-
lematic, category is comprised of the
people who live on a reservation but are
not enrolled anywhere. In some cases,
not enrolling may be a protest against
Indian Reorganization Act governments
seen as federally imposed or may be an
expression of religious or cultural con-
viction. In other cases, the tribe itself
may be lax about keeping its rolls up to
date, allowing benefits and political par-
ticipation to many who are not enrolled
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(and in some cases not even technically
eligible for enrollment under the tribe's
own constitution). Indians do not have
to enroll formally to obtain tribal bene-
fits in many tribes; some even have a
separate roll for internal purposes or an
informal "census roll." Moreover, unen-
rolled Indians are eligible for a wide
range of federal benefits directed to
persons recognized by the Secretary of
Interior as Indians without statutory ref-
erence to enrollment.2' Tribal and BIA
officials have variously stated that as
many as one-half of the Indians on some
reservations may not be enrolled.'
Tribal formal enrollment provisions
can thus vary dramatically from the ac-
tual tribal community. A well-known ex-
ample is illustrated in Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez."' The children in that case
were half Navajo and half Santa Clara
and had lived at Santa Clara all their
lives, but were not enrolled in either
tribe. According to former BIA Com-
missioner Robert Bennett, the same
problem arises in the Northeast. If a
child's mother is a Mohawk and father is
a Seneca, the child cannot be enrolled
in either tribe. 2 Commissioner Bennett
has reported other policies that may ex-
clude Indians, including a tribe that re-
quires members to return to the reserva-
tion every ten years to re-enroll. Other
tribes may still have the formal require-
ment that the parents reside on the
reservation when the children are born
for the children to be eligible. In addi-
tion, on some reservations, such as
Hopi, a large percentage of traditional
members are not enrolled.
This demographic evidence, while im-
pressive, is at present anecdotal. All
agree that accurate information is abso-
lutely essential to assess both the impact
of the decision and to fashion an appro-
priate solution. After the Oliphant case
it was reported that often no one was
policing crimes by non-Indians on reser-
vations because of lack of interest or
willingness to commit money by the
states and because federal prosecutors
were too far away or too strapped for re-
sources to take an interest." Duro can
only add to this problem. It is unlikely
that the federal government will be will-
ing to expend resources to prosecute
minor crimes and state governments,
even if granted jurisdiction, may not
want the extra burden or responsibility.
For example, the Western Governors'
Association, after consulting with tribal
leaders, expressed concern that states
may not be able to fill the jurisdictional
gap created by Duro, and asked
Congress to hold hearings in the west
on the impact of the case. 4 In contrast,
the Western Attorneys General organi-
zation voted to take the position that
giving the states jurisdiction over these
crimes will not unduly burden state law
enforcement officials, apparently on
pure conjecture that the added caseload
would be minimal and heedless of the
fact that state Attorneys General are
rarely, if ever, involved in the day-to-day,
largely misdemeanor law enforcement
affected by Duro13 We believe, however,
that when accurate statistics are collect-
ed they will reveal that this third group,
those who are not enrolled anywhere, is
larger than many presently suppose.
The 1990 amendment is designed to
restore the status quo before Duro until
Congress can gather the information
needed to determine if a comprehen-
sive legislative solution is necessary. To
evaluate the efficacy of this legislation,
it is necessary to examine in greater de-
tail the Court's recent activist role in
Indian law.
Indian Law Jurisprudence in the
Supreme Court
Two aspects of the Court's jurispru-
dence in recent Indian law cases are par-
ticularly disturbing. First, under the
rubric of federal common law, the Court
has begun to impose its own notions of
the role of tribal governments in the
United States system, arrogating to itself
an authority committed by the Constitu-
tion to Congress. Second, it has begun
sending signals of an overt willingness to
restrict congressional power over Indian
affairs. We will discuss these two trends
before turning to an analysis of the spe-
cific federal legislation.
The Court's method of setting policy
on the reach of tribal authority has been
to employ federal common law. In other
words, the rules of Oliphant and Duro are
not rules of constitutional law. When a
rule is not clearly suggested by a federal
enactment, the courts may perform
more than an interpretive function by
adopting common law rules to further
congressional intent. Nevertheless, fed-
eral common law is illegitimate unless it
is linked, however tenuously, to a deter-
mination of congressional intent. If the
rule is not so linked, the Court has en-
gaged in lawmaking that invades the
sphere of Congress.
Indian law presents a classic example
of an area in which the Court often
and legitimately creates law designed to
effectuate congressional policy. But
Congress retains control of policy to-
ward Indian tribes, and can correct the
Court's rule by appropriate legislation.
Unless the Court's rule is based on con-
stitutional law, the Court must respect
Congress' determination or exceed its
authority under Article III of the Con-
stitution by interfering with congres-
sional authority to make policy in Indi-
an law."
The second disturbing trend is the
Court's recent fixation on racial
classifications in Indian law. The Court
states a very crabbed view of congres-
sional power in Duro
That Indians are citizens does not
alter the Federal Government's broad
authority to legislate with respect to
enrolled Indians as a class, whether to
impose burdens or benefits."'
The inclusion of the word "enrolled"
suggests that perhaps this power of
Congress does not extend to unenrolled
Indians, however defined by Congress.
The current administration takes the
position that only enrolled Indians fall
within the government's responsibility.
According to the President's statement
accompanying the signing of S. 1846,
dated May 25, 1990:
The Supreme Court has made clear
that the Congress and the executive
branch may act to benefit members of
Indian tribes, as opposed to Indians
defined as a racial category, and I fully
support efforts to provide such assis-
tance. I am very concerned, however,
that section 2(a)(6) of the bill autho-
rizes racial preferences, divorced from
any requirement of tribal member-
ship, that will not meet judicial scruti-
ny under the Constitution. According-
ly, I am hereby directing interested
Cabinet Secretaries to consult with the
Attorney General to clarify and resolve
this issue.
The object of the President's concern
was a provision that amended an Indian
Self-Determination and Education Act
provision regarding conversions to per-
manent appointments to reference ex-
plicitly the definition of Indian in the
Indian Reorganization Act (IRA)."'
The Justice Department has also
taken the position that Congress cannot
grant any preferences to Indians that
are not linked to membership. In a let-
ter to Senator Daniel Inouye, the Office
of Legislative Affairs opposed the em-
ployment preference provided by the
law creating the Office of Indian Educa-
tion in the Department of Education)'
According to the Department:
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We believe that the preference grant-
ed by the Act to those who are actual
members of an Indian tribe is constitti-
tional tinder Morton v. Mancari, 417
U.S. 535 (1974). Those preferences
for Indians, however, that do not de-
pend solely upon membership in an In-
dian tribe, but rather depend solely
upon being a person of the Indian
racial group, are not justified under
that decision, and accordingly must be
examined tinder Supreme Court




Specifically, the letter objected to the
statutory definition of Indian as includ-
ing all those "considered by the Secre-
tary of the Interior to be an Indian for
any purpose."4 '
A judicial narrowing of the scope and
purpose of federal power over Indian af-
fairs to reach only enrolled members of
federally recognized Indian tribes would
have devastating results. As stated
above, the government's policies toward
Indians have radically altered the demo-
graphics of Indian country. If the trend
to narrow the reach of federal policy
taking place in the judicial and execu-
tive branches continues, these people
would not only not be subject to tribal
criminal jurisdiction, but could soon be-
come non-Indians for all purposes
under federal law. This group of peo-
ple, unenrolled in any tribe, are as poor
as any other group on the reservation, if
not poorer. Although the states would
then become responsible for this group,
because of their poverty and the greater
likelihood that they are landless, they
would offer little revenue to the states,
even in the form of tax sales of property.
It is doubtful that the states could ex-
pect special help from Congress to serve
this group. If it is beyond Congress's
constitutional power to fund the tribes
and, consequently, beyond the power of
agencies such as the BIA and IHS to
serve them as Indians, Congress could
hardly reimburse the states for the cost
of assuming the burden.
In sum, Congress' response to the
criminal jurisdiction void created by
Duro needs to take into account both of
these trends, so as not to give the Court
any basis for assuming that Congress ac-
quiesces with the Court's vision of both
the reach of congressional power and its
vision of its own role in making Indian
policy. We believe that the amendment,
while not a model of clarity, represents
an important first step for Congress to
reassert its role in Indian law.
The 1990 ICRA Amendment
The Conference Committee Report
leaves little doubt regarding the pur-
pose of the amendment, by stating con-
gressional action was necessary "to ad-
dress an emergency situation in Indian
country that is the result of a recent
holding of the Supreme Court in
[Duro.] "2 The report also makes a
strong statement affirming congression-
al power and purpose in the field of In-
dian law:
Throughout the history of this coun-
try, the Congress has never questioned
the power of tribal courts to exercise
misdemeanor jurisdiction over non-
tribal member Indians in the same
manner that such courts exercise mis-
demeanor jurisdiction over tribal
members. Instead, the Congress has
recognized that tribal governments af-
ford a broad array of rights and privi-
leges to non-tribal members. Non-
tribal member Indians own property
on Indian reservations, their children
attend tribal schools, their families re-
ceive health care from tribal hospitals
and clinics. Federally-administered
programs and services are provided to
Indian people because of their status
as Indians without regard to whether
their tribal membership is the same as
their reservation residence. The issue
of who is an Indian for purposes of
Federal law is well-settled as a finction
of two hundred years of Constitutional
and case law and Federal statutes."'
What makes the amendment so un-
usual is that it does not purport to cre-
ate new law, as would, for example, a
delegation of power to tribes. Instead of
granting jurisdiction to tribes, section
8077(b) "recognize[s] and affirm[s]"
tribal inherent power over "all Indi-
ans."' The conference report also uses
the term "recognizes" consistently.
Congress does have the power to dele-
gate to tribes criminal jurisdiction over
all Indians. By delegating, however,
Congress would be acceding to the
Court's vision of the extent of tribal
sovereignty. More importantly, a delega-
tion would mean that tribes would be
exercising federal power to which feder-
al constitutional standards are applica-
ble. Tribal court systems, which are
often informal and always poorly fi-
nanced, would then have to accord de-
fendants all rights, privileges and pro-
tections now in force in the most sophis-
ticated legal systems in the majority soci-
ety, including free licensed attorneys for
all defendants facing jail time."' These
constitutional requirements might also
include such requirements as a republi-
can form of government (questioning
theocratic or hereditary governments at
least insofar as they affect non-mem-
bers). The applicability of the Establish-
ment clause to these cases would also
call into question the legitimacy of theo-
cratic tribal governments.
In addition to amending the defini-
tion of powers of Indian tribes to re-
assert tribal criminal jurisdiction over all
Indians, the amendment also contains a
unique definition of the term "Indian."
Although federal statutes in recent years
have defined the term, the amendment
references existing judicial definitions
of the term, as they have been devel-
oped in the 100 years since the Major
Crimes Act was enacted.1 7 Consistently
interpreting the term "Indian" as in-
cluding both members and non-mem-
bers, federal courts have developed a
definition of who is an Indian for pur-
poses of the federal criminal statutes
that also requires a sufficient recogni-
tion and identification in the communi-
ty as an Indian to prevent the arbitrary
application of the term to someone who
has had only a tenuous connection with
his or her Indian heritage."
The amendment raises complex and
subtle issues of constitutional law, espe-
cially relating to separation of powers.
Although a full analysis of these issues is
not permitted by the limited space, we
do believe these questions can and must
be resolved in favor of preserving con-
gressional prerogatives to set policy in In-
dian affairs. It has been argued, for ex-
ample, that appropriations riders "under-
mine the spirit of [INS v.] Chadha"'' be-
cause "they are frequently not the prod-
uct of legislative deliberation and consen-
sus. " " Congress can and has amended
substantive legislation through provisions
in appropriations acts." The Court po-
lices the process by requiring Congress to
state explicitly its intent to modify an ex-
isting law in an appropriations rider," a
requirement that has been satisfied in
this case by explicit reference to the Indi-
an Civil Rights Act and by the Confer-
ence Committee Report, even if we were
to interpret a statute amending a defini-
tion section of an existing law as a modifi-
cation. The objections to lawmaking
through riders carry greater force in the
context of a law making a substantive
change through a back door. For exam-
ple, a new civil rights bill with quotas,
slipped into a National Endowment for
the Arts appropriation, could rightly be
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criticized for subverting the congres-
sional process. In contrast, however,
this law is a statement of policy, akin to a
Joint Resolution of Congress which
seeks to clarify Congress' belief that trib-
al powers include the power to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.
Only if the Court's decision in Duro is
not correctable, should this law be de-
nied any effect.
Moreover, Congress has a history of
making Indian policy through appropri-
ations riders. In 1871, the House at-
tached a rider to the Appropriations Act
stating that "[N]o Indian nation or tribe
within the territory of the United States
shall be acknowledged or recognized as
an independent nation, tribe, or power
with whom the United States may con-
tract by treaty."'151 By this mechanism the
House insisted on being included in In-
dian policymaking, formerly dominated
by the President and Senate through the
treaty mechanism. At most, this statute
should have been read as barring feder-
al-tribal agreements through the treaty
process. After the 1871 law, the execu-
tive branch continued to negotiate
agreements with the tribes which were
then enacted into laws meeting the bi-
cameralism and presentment require-
ments of the Constitution. But the
Supreme Court gave this policy state-
ment the broadest possible interpreta-
tion. In cases such as United States v.
Kagamad' and Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock'5 (re-
ferred to by a Court of Claims judge as
the Dred Scott decision of Indian law),"
the Court read into this policy statement
about shared responsibility a broader
purpose to subjugate Indian tribes to
United States domestic law, and thus
ushered in the plenary power era.7 This
forced subjugation is what the Court is
today fond of calling the period when




It is possible that the Court could in-
terpret the amendment so as to avoid
any serious constitutional questions
while retaining the structure created by
Duro. For example, although the lan-
guage and legislative history does not
appear to permit such an interpretation,
the Court might interpret the language
in section 8077(b) as a grant of power,
despite the apparently careful efforts of
the drafters to avoid this interpretation.
In so doing, the Court could resort to
the sort of "savings construction"' it em-
ploys when Congress has sailed unac-
ceptably close to the shoals of constitu-
tional permissibility."
If the Court interprets the amend-
ment as an exercise of congressional
power to set the limits of tribal sovereign-
ty, it may nevertheless hold that the rule
of Duro is not one that can be corrected
by Congress. The Court has stated that
the rule of the Oliphant line of cases is a
rule of federal law."' We believe that the
law regarding tribal-national relations is
rightly viewed as analogous to the law of
federal-state relations in the absence of
preemptive federal legislation. As in the
dormant commerce clause cases, the
Court is influenced by its impression of
congressional expectations, which ex-
pectations, if incorrect, can be clari-
fied."' In short, the decision did not rest
on constitutional grounds, but on the
peculiar Oliphant notion of the judicially
discovered inherent limitations on tribal
powers by virtue of their status as do-
mestic dependent nations.
Nevertheless, the opinion is greatly
influenced by constitutional values, even
if they are values, such as the Lockean
social contract theory, that should not
necessarily be imposed on Indian tribes.
Consequently, the Court could reinter-
pret its opinion as one resting on a con-
stitutional basis by, for example, decid-
ing that Indian tribes are either sub-
sidiaries of the federal government,
bound to the same constitutional limita-
tions on all their functions as are agen-
cies of government, or go to the oppo-
site extreme and determine that Indian
tribes are merely private clubs, despite
Justice Rehnquist's often-quoted state-
ment to the contrary."' As private clubs
they would have no sovereign powers,
but merely exercise powers over their
own members. An equally disturbing al-
ternative would be to interpret Duro as
creating a constitutional right for non-
member Indians to be free from gover-
nance by another tribe. It is difficult to
see how the Court could reach either re-
sult without overturning Talton v. Mayes,
163 U.S. 376 (1896), and destroying the
vision of the unique role of Indian
tribes that has informed the jurispru-
dence relating to the status of indige-
nous peoples that is rightly invoked as a
model to be emulated by other nations.
If tribes are not purely private organiza-
tions, they would be reduced to sub-
sidiaries of the federal government.
To round out what looks like a parade
of horribles, the Court could also
choose a case challenging the amend-
ments as an opportunity to limit con-
gressional power to members of federal-
ly recognized Indian tribes. If Congress
were to acquiesce to a limitation of its
power to enrolled Indians, its acquies-
cence would unweave the complex fab-
ric of federal jurisdiction and control in
Indian country. The Duro opinion itself
stated the Court's belief that Congress
had greater power than other govern-
ment entities to define the class of Indi-
ans to be benefitted from federal legisla-
tion. "' Although the Court expressly left
the question open, this language leaves
open the possibility that the Court will
uphold the classification in 18 U.S.C. §
1152 and other federal criminal laws.'
We have tried to describe some of the
pitfalls and benefits to be gained by the
ICRA amendments. We believe that it is
appropriate for Congress to send the
Court a clear signal that Congress is in
charge of the scope of its power over In-
dians. Questions regarding what is nec-
essary for a tribe to be considered to
have a sufficient relationship to an in-
digenous group to qualify to be treated
as an Indian tribe by Congress and what
is necessary for an Indian to be treated
as within the scope of Indian law are
quite properly addressed by Congress
and should not be resolved by the Court
based on isolated anecdotal evidence,
raising questions as to whether some de-
fendants have been treated fairly in trib-
al courts. In fact, we believe that the
amendments accord the judiciary its
proper and appropriate scope while pre-
serving the power of Congress to set the
parameters of Indian law, within consti-
tutional limits. For example, concerns
regarding the classification of "Indian"
as being purely racial have been taken
into account by the 100 years of judicial
precedent interpreting the term for pur-
poses of the Major Crimes Act. By incor-
porating these judicial determinations,
carefully made on a case-by-case basis,
Congress has shown due deference to
the judiciary's role of protecting the in-
dividual from being arbitrarily labeled
an Indian purely on racial grounds. By
announcing its intent to take compre-
hensive action, if necessary, but only
after extensive consultations with the
states, the federal government, and the
tribes, Congress has also positioned itself
to provide for a more permanent solu-
tion or one that more fairly balances the
needs of the competing sovereigns, if
such a solution is called for.
The Congressional response to Duro is
unusual, but not without precedent.
Both the War Powers Act and the Bud-
get Impoundment Control Act were de-
signed in effect to instruct the other
branches regarding Congress' views on
one of its powers." Both statutes were
controversial in that the Constitution
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quite clearly provided for shared power
over committing the nation's armed
forces and allocating federal money. In
contrast, the commerce clause's com-
mitment of Indian commerce to the
Congress has never been challenged by
the Court, even in cases in which a chal-
lenge might have been appropriate in
order to preserve tribal rights. Congres-
sional plenary power over Indians rests
on two footings: the political relation-
ship between tribes and the United
States and the Indians' need for protec-
tion from the states. To limit the broad
power over Indians to only those en-
rolled in federally recognized tribes
would usurp from Congress its power to
determine the scope of its authority.
Not since the conservative activist major-
ity of the Court imposed its own vision
of economic theory on Congress by
reinterpreting and greatly restricting
congressional power in the 1930's and
1940's, has the Court restricted the
scope of congressional power.
The Court has continually shown ex-
traordinary deference to Congress when
it sought to abrogate treaties with tribes,
break up the tribal estate and give it to
individual Indians or sell it to non-Indi-
ans, and a host of other actions opposed
by Indians, but found to be within the
federal trust or plenary powers. Here,
where the Congress is merely recogniz-
ing a power that Indian tribes have, a
priori, had from time immemorial, we
believe the Court should also defer.
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